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MARTIN v. WILKS
by Frank E. Deale*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the United States Supreme Court's holding in Matin v.
Wilky1 is clear, the controversy surrounding the case stems from two issues:
1) whether it was necessary for the Court to reach the issue on the facts
of the case before it; and 2) what the ultimate consequences of the case
for affirmative action plans and race discrimination employment litigation
in general will be.
Martin held that the "impermissible collateral attack" doctrine,
which had been utilized by the vast majority of courts of appeal to insulate
"title VII" consent decrees from subsequent attack,2 violated the accepted
general principle of American jurisprudence that when one is not a party
to a litigation, one is not bound by the judgment, decree or order arising
therefrom.' Courts have used this "impermissible collateral attack"
doctrine, or its functional equivalent, to prevent challenges to consent
decrees which provide affirmative action relief and resolve claims of
discrimination covered by title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 In
assuring that the parties would not face multiple and continuing liabilities
from a course of conduct that a consent decree has discontinued, the
collateral attack doctrine also had served the purposes of finality and
* Legal Director, Center for Constitutional Rights, New York, New York; Adjunct
Faculty, City University of New York Law School at Queens College. B.A. 1976, Antioch
College; J.D. 1979, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The views expressed are solely
those of the author.
1. 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
2. Id. at 2185. The cases cited indicate that at that time of the Court's decision only
the 7th Circuit, in Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1986), allowed collateral attacks
on consent decrees by nonparties. Martin, 109 S. Ct. 2185 n.3..
3. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940). Hansberry involved a number
of landowners who were all privy to an agreement not to allow their lots to be sold to or
lived upon by blacks. Several of the landowners brought suit against others who had
allowed their land to be acquired and occupied by blacks in violation of the agreement.
Id. at 37-38. The defendants claimed that the agreement was invalid, to which the
plaintiffs answered that the agreement had been held valid by an earlier judgment decree.
Id. at 38. The defendants then argued, and the Supreme Court agreed, that they could
not be bound by the previous decree since they were not parties to that action. Id. at 38,
40 (relying on Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)).
4. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2185-86. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
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judicial efficiency.' In following the consent decrees, courts have assumed
that nonparties had a duty to inform themselves and intervene in litigations
where their rights may be affected,' and which, up until now, has
essentially precluded subsequent challenges by nonparties who have had
the opportunity to litigate.
Notwithstanding the apparent unanimity in the courts of appeal,
it became evident in 1982 that the Supreme Court would have to address
the issue of proliferation of the impermissible collateral attack doctrine.
The first hint that some members of the Court were concerned by this
issue came in Thaggard v. City of Jackson.7 The case began in 1975 with
litigation instituted by the United States Department of Justice and a
number of black plaintiffs alleging that the city of Jackson had maintained
a pattern and practice of discriminating against minority job applicants in
hiring for, and promoting members of, the city police department. 8 In an
attempt to resolve the litigation, the city entered into consent decrees
providing affirmative action relief to black plaintiffs.9 That relief was
challenged in a subsequent lawsuit by white police officers who alleged
that the city was discriminating against them by reason of the decree.'
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district
court dismissing the case, concluding that the allowance of such a
challenge would expose the parties who signed the decree to "inconsistent
or contradictory proceedings."" The Supreme Court denied certiorari.2
5. See, e.g., Hefner v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 605 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1979)
(allowing plaintiff to attack the decree at this point would severely undercut important
notions of judicial efficiency and finality of judgment, and would unfairly prejudice other
parties and nonparties); see also Prate v. Freedman, 430 F. Supp. 1373, 1375 (W.D.N.Y.)
(allowing collateral attack on decrees would "result in continued uncertainty for all parties
involved and render the concept of final judgments meaningless"), aff'd without opinion,
573 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978).
6. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (discussing intervention as a right and permissive
intervention).
7. 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982).
8. Id. at 67.
9. Id. The decrees in the cases required that the city of Jackson: 1) adopt and achieve
a goal of hiring blacks for one half of all vacancies in all job classifications until the
proportion of blacks to whites equalled the proportion of blacks to whites in the working
age population in Jackson; and 2) establish separate promotion lists for white and black
employees, promoting alternately from each list in a one-to-one ratio until the proportion
of blacks in supervisory positions, and in the ranks of patrolperson, is equal to the
proportion of blacks to whites in the working age population in Jackson. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 68 (quoting O'Burn v. Shapp, 70 F.R.D. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1976)).
12. Ashley v. City of Jackson, Miss., 464 U.S. 900, reh'g denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983).
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However, in a dissent from that decision, Justice Rehnquist argued that the
Court should hear the case, citing the "fundamental premise of preclusion
law that nonparties to a prior action are not bound by the judgment. " 3
In Justice Rehnquist's view, "[nionparties have an independent
right to an adjudication of their claim that a defendant's conduct is
unlawful."'4 Justice Rehnquist also stated:
This principle should apply with all the more
force to a consent decree, which is little more than a
contract between the parties, formalized by the signature
of a judge. The central feature of any consent decree is
that it is not an adjudication on the merits. The decree
may be scrutinized by the judge for fairness prior to his
approval, but there is no contest or decision on the merits
of the issues underlying the lawsuit. Such a decree binds
the signatories, but cannot be used as a shield against all
future suits by nonparties seeking to challenge conduct
that may or may not be governed by the decree. 5
Only Justice Brennan joined Justice Rehnquist in his dissent."
That these two Justices, with their contrasting approaches to interpreting
the Constitution, agreed that this issue should be heard by the full Court
assured that the issue would be aired in due course.
In Marino v. Ortiz,7 the Court granted certiorari to assess a
challenge to a consent decree entered in a title VII discrimination suit
brought by black and Latino candidates for positions as police officers. 8
The decree was challenged by a group of whites who claimed that they
13. Id. at 902 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
.14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 900.
17. 484 U.S. 301 (1988).
18. Id. at 303-04. The decree allowed for the promotion of black and Latino
candidates for police positions until the racial/ethnic composition of the new sergeants was
equal to that of the composition of candidates taking the test. The decree was signed by
all the co-defendants including the Sergeants Benevolent Association and the Sergeants
Eligible Association, two organizations representing officers who obtained provisional
appointments to the rank of sergeant and those officers who were on the eligible list for
appointment. Also permitted to sign the decree was another group representing several
white ethnic societies and individual officers. Id. at 303.
Syrup. 199o1
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were entitled to promotions based on their higher examination scores. 9
The Court split four to four on the question of whether the decree could
be subject to such a collateral attack,2° thereby upholding the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals determination that such a challenge was
barred.21 The case was decided on January 13, 1988, a little over a month
before Justice Kennedy took his seat on the Court.
II. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court decided Martin v. Wilks, shortly after the
highly controversial Bork Senate confirmation fight. The Bork
confirmation hearings underscored the political and legal significance of
retiring Justice Powell's vote on a highly fragmented Court. Justice
Kennedy joined a majority opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist, providing
the fifth vote necessary to prevent continued use of the impermissible
collateral attack doctrine.u Chief Justice Rehnquist began his opinion
with the observation that
[a]ll agree that "[i]t is a principle of general application in
anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a
judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not
designated as a party or to which he has not been made
a party by service of process."3
Following this opening salvo, the Court set forth a number of reasons
based on law and policy to support its conclusion.2'
Foremost in the Court's analysis was the notion that the interests
served by the impermissible collateral attack doctrine would be "better
19. Id. But cf. Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982) ("reverse
discrimination" actions constituted impermissible collateral attacks upon earlier consent
decrees), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 900, reh'g denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983).
20. Marino, 484 U.S. at 304. Although the Court does not release the voting lineup
when it is split, the subsequent decision in Martin leads to a strong inference that
Rehnquist, C.J., White, O'Connor and Scalia, JJ., were of the opinion that a district court
may not dismiss as an impermissible collateral attack a lawsuit challenging a consent decree
by nonparties, and Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., were of the view that
such cases should be dismissed. See Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2188; id. at 2189 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
21. Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1986).
22. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2182.
23. Id. at 2184 (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)).
24. See id. at 2185-88.
[Vol. VII
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served by mandatory joinder procedures."5 By placing the burden of
informing all potentially interested parties to a lawsuit on the plaintiff,
rather than requiring that potential defendants or others whose rights may
have been affected intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
the Court implemented its underlying concern that "[t]he linchpin of the
'impermissible collateral attack' doctrine -- the attribution of preclusive
effect to a failure to intervene -- is therefore quite inconsistent with Rule
19 and Rule 24."'
It was clear from the opinion that the Court was able to
anticipate some of the difficulties its resolution of this matter would
impose on plaintiffs and employers in employment discrimination suits.2
This article will discuss some of these difficulties. However, there was
some dispute in the majority and dissenting opinions as to whether the
district court's decision, and even the Supreme Court in previous cases
itself, had applied the doctrine as it has been understood.28
In 1974, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., and
individual black plaintiffs filed separate class action complaints against the
city of Birmingham and the Jefferson County Personnel Board, alleging
that the hiring and promotion of firefighters was being carried out in a
racially discriminatory manner.2 After trial, but before entry of
judgment, two consent decrees were signed by the parties which provided
long term goals for the hiring of black firefighters." After a fairness
hearing, but before final approval of the decrees, the Birmingham
Firefighters Association filed objections as an amicus curiae and, later,
along with two association members, sought to intervene in the action. 1
25. Id. at 2185 (quoting 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4452 (1981)). The court stated that "Rule 19(a) provides
for mandatory joinder in circumstances where a judgment rendered in the absence of a
person may 'leave ... persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring..
inconsistent obligations. .. .' Id. (quoting FED. R CIv. P. 19(a)) (footnote omitted).26. Id. at 2186. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). This is the rule on intervention as
of right which states that "[ulpon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene
in an action: ... (2) when the applicant claims an interest ... and he is so situated that
the disposition of the action may... impair or impede his ability to protect that interest
.. I d.
27. See Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2187.
28. See, e.g., id. at 2188-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting). White employees may not be
deprived of their legal rights. However, consent decrees may, as a practical matter,
produce changes in opportunities for employment or promotion, although white employees
are not bound by the decrees in any legal sense. See id.
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Intervention was denied to this group on the basis of being untimely.'
Another group of seven firefighters who filed a complaint seeking
injunctive relief against the operation of the decree was also denied
relief.33
After these two denials of intervention were affirmed on appeal,'
yet another group of white firefighters brought suit against the city and the
board alleging that they too were being denied promotions in favor of
blacks who were "less qualified."' The city and the board, along with a
group of blacks who intervened on the side of the defendants, moved to
dismiss this action based on the impermissible collateral attack doctrine.36
The district court denied the motions, although the city had admitted to
making race-conscious decisions.37
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court
and held that the plaintiffs were wrongfully precluded from raising their
claims?8 The court explicitly rejected the impermissible collateral attack
doctrine, holding that the policies in favor of the doctrine "must yield to
the policy against requiring third parties to submit to bargains in which
their interests were either ignored or sacrificed."39  After granting
certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed this decision five to four.'
The Supreme Court was sharply divided over the analysis of the
district court decision.41 The majority of the Court held that the white
plaintiffs should have been allowed to challenge employment decisions
taken pursuant to the decrees.42 The court of appeals had reversed the
lower court's decision when it found that the district court erred in holding
32. Id.
33. Id. (the seven firefighters argued that the decrees would operate to illegally
discriminate against them).




38. In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492,
1497-98 (11th Cir. 1987).
39. Id. at 1498 (citing Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 589
n.4 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The policy favoring voluntary settlement does not,
of course, countenance unlawful discrimination against existing employees.")).
40. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2188.
41. Rehnquist, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which White, O'Connor,
Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., joined. Id. at 2182.
42. Id. at 2183.
[Vol. VII
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that the plaintiffs were bound by a decree to which they were not
parties.4 3 Yet, Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, reiterated that
the district court concluded that the consent decrees were justified and
lawful because the city "had not promoted any black officers who were not
qualified or who were demonstrably less qualified than the whites who
were not promoted."4 In essence, the dissent claimed that the district
court had not applied the impermissible collateral attack doctrine to bar
the litigation by the white firefighters, but rather had rejected the claims
of the white firefighters on the merits.'
11L DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court's conclusion that the burden of notifying
relevant parties to a lawsuit must fall on the plaintiffs through utilization
of the rules for joinder of parties' will have enormous repercussions for
future employment discrimination cases. Plaintiffs will now have to devote
large amounts of time, energy and resources to assessing who the proper
defendants should be when contemplating litigation. Prior to the decision
in Martin, most litigation of this type focused on the discriminating
agency,47 the municipality,4 and a small number of private individuals.49
Now, however, plaintiffs will have to consider joining as parties to the
decrees unions, trade associations, and any group which could have an
43. In re Birmingham, 833 F.2d at 1497 (the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded the case with instructions that the district court try plaintiffs' claim of
unlawful discrimination).
44. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2194 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 2195 ("[T]he Court of Appeals, and the majority opinion all fail to draw
attention to any point in this case's long history at which the [district court] judge may
have given the impression that any nonparty was legally bound by the consent decree.")
(footnote omitted). Certainly this is a plausible conclusion in light of the fact that a five
day trial ensued below on the claims of the white firefighters. See id. at 2201.
46. Id. at 2186 (majority opinion) (relying on Penn-Cent. Merger and N & W
Inclusion Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 505 n.4 (1968)).
47. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S.
616 (1987) (plaintiff brought suit against the Santa Clara County Transportation Agency
alleging discrimination in the Agency's hiring and promotion practices); Brown v. General
Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820 (1976) (plaintiff brought suit against the General Services
Administration claiming that it had discriminated against him by failing to promote him).
48. See, e.g., Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO v. City of Cleveland,
478 U.S. 501 (1986) (plaintiff sued the city of Cleveland alleging discrimination in the
municipality's hiring, promoting and assigning of firefighters).
49. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (the "person" in
this case is a fictitious person in the form of the private corporation defendant who
allegedly violated title VII by firing a black employee).
Syrup. 1990]
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interest in defeating an affirmative action plan or race discrimination suit
at a particular job site. In cases where individuals feel that a consent
decree or affirmative action plan will result in the promotion of
unqualified minority applicants, the potential nonminority job seekers for
those positions become highly relevant."0 It will be virtually impossible to
identify all individuals and organizations who might seek to relitigate the
issues that have been resolved by the consent decree.
Once these individuals and/or organizations have been identified,
there will have to be a strategic decision whether to join them as party
defendants. If they are joined, it will bring into the litigation people and
organizations who may not be directly responsible for acts of discrimination
but who may be affected by the judgment or the relief.51 An action which
was initially conceived of as a bi-polar suit, will be transformed into a
multi-polar or polycentric suit, with all the difficulties endemic to such
actions.52 Those groups and individuals which have been brought into
such litigation may not have an interest in the litigation until they have
been sued. Yet bringing them into the litigation will most assuredly
develop antagonistic relationships ultimately destructive of intergroup
relations, morale at the job site, and the congressionally expressed
preference for conciliation and settlement of such actions.53
The chief means by which these policies have been effectuated has
been through the consent decree. 4 An employer confronted with
50. See generally Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). For a
more detailed analysis of Wards Cove, see Reed, The Immediate Fallout of Wards Cove,
7 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. J. RTS. 65 (Symposium 1990).
51. See Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200 (1988). See also
Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFFALO L. REv. 485, 489 (1989). To
sue or join as a party defendant in a discrimination suit one who is not responsible for acts
of discrimination could expose the plaintiff to liabilities under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. That rule allows for the assessment of a fine against attorneys who sign
a pleading which is not well grounded in fact. Researchers have concluded that Rule 11
has already been applied disproportionately against civil rights plaintiffs. Id.
52. See generally Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV.
353, 394-404 (1978). The late Professor Fuller noted that a problem or case which is
polycentric, Le., containing several different parties or persons with conflicting viewpoints,
will necessarily complicate the adjudicative process. Id. at 394-95 ('In such a case it is
simply impossible to afford each affected party a meaningful participation .... ").
53. For a discussion of the congressional preference for conciliation and settlement,
as opposed to litigation, see United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203-04
(1979) (discussing H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 18 (1963)).
54. See generally Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain. Title VIi Consent
Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE LJ. 887.
Between 1972 and 1983, the Justice Department sued and obtained
relief under Title VII against 106 state and local government employ-
[Vol. Vill
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wideranging multi-polar litigation will be extremely unlikely to settle such
an action because of fears that the action may be kept alive by party
defendants who would prefer that the fight continue.5 There is even less
incentive for settlement if entry of the consent decree will not absolve the
employer from future litigation which challenges acts authorized by the
decree. Furthermore, Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion noted that the
reasoning of the majority applies as much to judgments and litigated orders
as to consent decrees, 6 which, will compound the difficulties discussed
above.
IV. CONCLUSION
Prior to Martin, the Court did not address the standard to be
applied in cases where a nonparty is attacking the relief provided by a
consent decree. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the
test adopted by the Court in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber" and
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California,s8 should
govern. 9 These cases held that voluntary affirmative action programs will
pass muster if: 1) there is a manifest statistical imbalance that reflects an
underrepresentation of minorities or women in traditionally segregated job
categories; and 2) the relief designed to remedy the imbalance does not
unnecessarily trammel the rights of nonminority employees or create an
absolute bar to their advancement.6°
The Court's reluctance to discuss the standard should come as no
surprise because its political makeup is shifting, as indicated by the Court's
most recent decision in the affirmative action area, City of Richmond v. J.A.
ers; of these cases, ninety-three - some eighty-eight percent -- were
settled by consent decree. It would be fair to say that far more
employees and job applicants are directly affected by the provisions of
consent decrees than by litigated judgments in Title VII cases.
Id. at 894 (footnotes omitted).
55. See Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2200 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 2200 n.30 (relying on 29 C.F.R. § 1608.8 (1989)). In reaching its decision,
the majority refused to give weight to 29 C.F.R. § 1608.8 which has been interpreted by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to insulate actions taken pursuant to
court order from liability under title VII, and does not distinguish between orders "entered
by consent or after contested litigation." Id. at 2199-200 & n.30 (quoting 29 C.F.R. §
1608.8).
57. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
58. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
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Croson Co.6" In that case, the Court struck down an affirmative action
plan which required prime contractors to whom the city awarded
construction contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount to
minority business enterprises.' 2 Justice O'Connor, in the majority
opinion, stated that the plan violated the fourteenth amendment, adding
that "[t]here is nothing approaching a prima facie case of a constitutional
or statutory violation by anyone in the Richmond construction industry."'
This language of the opinion had the approval of Justice Kennedy" who
was not sitting on the Court when Weber and Johnson were decided.
Justice Powell, who was replaced by Justice Kennedy, had joined in the
Johnson majority in creating the "manifest imbalance" test.'
One may safely assume that the manifest imbalance test, which has
served for over a decade as a legal predicate for voluntary affirmative
action plans, will be replaced by a more stringent test."6 As a
consequence, some consent decrees may be challenged under a standard
which is different from the standard accepted when originally signed. One
of the few cases concerning challenged consent decrees decided after
Martin, is Henry v. City of Gadsden, Alabama.'7 In Henry, the trial court
felt it necessary to conclude, not only that the decree entered into satisfied
the test appropriated from Weber and Johnson, but also that there was a
statistical prima facie case of discrimination established as a justification
for the consent decree."
Moreover, before Croson, there was never a majority to hold that
a governmental affirmative action plan that disadvantaged whites must be
tested by strict scrutiny." It is now established, because of Martin, that
strict scrutiny applies to such plans which have not been enacted or
approved by Congress.70 The question then arises whether all the
noncongressional, pre-Croson affirmative action plans embodied in consent
61. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
62. Id. at 712-13.
63. Id. at 724 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
64. Id. at 712.
65. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 618.
66. The Court's recent trend of replacing the manifest imbalance test is addressed in
more depth by the author in an upcoming issue of the New York University Review of
Law and Social Change.
67. 715 F. Supp. 1065 (N.D. Ala. 1989).
68. Id. at 1068-69.
69. Cf. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (the plurality
applied a test less stringent than strict scrutiny).
70. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 721; Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997,
3009 (1989).
[Vol. Via
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decrees are now vulnerable to collateral attack because they may not
survive strict scrutiny.
V. AFERWORD
As of this writing, the Court has not yet agreed to hear any
affirmative action cases for the October, 1990 Term. When the Court does
hear another affirmative action case, the manner in which it deals with the
issues discussed above will have great bearing on the future of affirmative
action.

